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This article reintroduces workers' compensation as a topic given
periodic treatment in the Annual Survey of Virginia Law. Prior to
the creation of the Virginia Court of Appeals, effective January 1,
1985,1 the law of workers' compensation had become static and
predictable; accordingly, other areas were given priority in the Sur-
vey. This article covers selected significant developments in the
law since 1985.
The past seven-and-one-half years have produced a number of
changes in this area of the law, and succeeding years promise to
offer even more. In the last session of the Virginia General Assem-
bly, House Joint Resolution Number 1722 proposed a full study of
the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act)3 as a result of societal
and legal changes of the past thirty years. Although the proposal
failed,4 the Governor has created an Advisory Commission on
Workers' Compensation to further examine and evaluate the Act
and to make recommendations for legislation by December 15,
1992.5
* Partner, Goldblatt, Lipkin & Cohen, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia; B.A., 1977, Old Dominion
University; J.D., 1981, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. Act of Mar. 25, 1983, ch. 413, 1983 Va. Acts 519 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-
116.01 to -116.014 (Repl. Vol. 1988 & Cum. Supp. 1992)).
2. H.J. Res. 172, Va. General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1992).
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-100 to -131 (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
4. H.J. Res. 172 was passed by indefinitely on Feb. 7, 1992 by the House Committee on
Rules.
5. Exec. Order No. 50(92) (June 11, 1992). The Advisory Commission is to examine:
the definition of injury; attorney's fees for injured employees, including those who
refuse suitable employment; awards for a change in condition; refusal of employment;
* . . the process for obtaining medical opinions [and] costs of health benefits to in-
jured employees and ways to contain increases in such costs without decreasing the
quality of health care...
Id. at 1-2.
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II. THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT
The Act was recodified effective October 1, 1991, in title 65.2 of
the Code of Virginia (the Code).' Sections 65.1-1 through 65.1-163
of the former Act were repealed by the General Assembly. The
recodification involved some substantive changes and further insti-
tuted a new section numbering system. One of the more obvious
changes is that what had been the Industrial Commission now is
named the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission (the
Commission). However, the bulk of the Act remains intact.7
III. INJURY BY ACCIDENT
A. Introduction
The standard workers' compensation case requires proof by the
employee (claimant) of an "injury by accident" arising out of and
in the course of his employment.' Special provisions exist for occu-
pational diseases and will be discussed separately.'
"Injury by accident" is not defined by statute; however, case law
has established an accepted definition, i.e., an identifiable incident,
occurring at a reasonably definite time, which results in an obvious
sudden mechanical or structural change in the claimant's body.' °
B. Pre-Existing Condition
As in traditional personal injury law, an employer takes an em-
ployee as he finds him." Accordingly, "[w]hen an injury sustained
in an industrial accident accelerates or aggravates a pre-existing
6. Act of Mar. 20, 1991, ch. 355, 1991 Va. Acts 509 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 65.2-100 to -1310 (Repl. Vol. 1991)). The primary changes involved (i) revisions to the
definition of "employee" and a consolidation of the sections which had been in § 65.1 con-
cerning this issue; (ii) clarification of the status of statutory employees under Chapter 3; and
(iii) revision of the "heart, lung and hypertension Act." Id.
7. For the work of the Code Commission in this regard, see REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA CODE
COMMISSION OF THE RECODIFICATION OF TITLE 65.1 OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA, H. Doc. No. 38
(1991) [hereinafter CODE COMMISSION REPORT].
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Repl. Vol. 1991) (definition of "injury").
9. See infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
10. See generally Lane Co. v. Saunders, 229 Va. 196, 326 S.E.2d 702 (1985); Kraft Dairy
Group, Inc. v. Bernardini, 229 Va. 253, 329 S.E.2d 46 (1985).
11. Pendleton v. Flippo Constr. Co., 1 Va. App. 381, 384, 339 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1986).
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condition,. . . disability resulting therefrom is compensable under
the Workers' Compensation Act."
12
Despite this traditional rule, there are instances in which the ex-
istence of a pre-existing condition may constitute a defense to the
payment of benefits. The first and most common situation is where
a claimant misrepresents his physical or medical condition or pre-
vious injuries in an employment application.13 Additionally, where
the employment merely aggravates or exacerbates an ordinary dis-
ease of life the injury is not compensable.
4
C. Repetitive Trauma/Gradual Injury
One frequently encountered defense to a claim for compensation
is that the injury is the result of repetitive trauma rather than an
injury by accident. The frequency with which this defense is raised
indicates the actual manner in which most injuries, especially
those to the back, manifest themselves. The Virginia Court of Ap-
peals tried - unsuccessfully - to address, clarify, and remedy this
issue in a series of cases: Bradley v. Philip Morris,15 Morris v. Mor-
ris,' Door Systems v. Hood,'7 and Pittsburgh Plate Glass v.
Totten. 8
In Bradley v. Philip Morris, the claimant was required to move
several heavy barrels of scrap metal while at work.' 9 During his
lunch break later that day, the claimant felt a pain in his back.
The deputy Commissioner awarded compensation benefits, the full
12. Olsten of Richmond v. Leftwich, 230 Va. 317, 319-20, 336 S.E.2d 893, 895 (1985) (cit-
ing Ohio Valley Constr. Co. v. Jackson, 230 Va. 56, 58, 334 S.E.2d 554, 555 (1985)). See also
Kemp v. Tidewater Kiewit, 7 Va. App. 360, 363, 373 S.E.2d 725, 726 (1988).
13. See McDaniel v. Colonial Mechanical Corp., 3 Va. App. 408, 411, 350 S.E.2d 225, 227
(1986). The employer, however, must show that the misrepresentation is related to the later
injury. Grimes v. Shenandoah Valley Press, 12 Va. App. 665, 667, 406 S.E.2d 407, 409
(1991).
14. Ashland Oil Co. v. Bean, 225 Va. 1, 3, 300 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1983). This case still
supports the statement in the text; however, it was decided prior to the enactment of § 65.1-
46.1 (now § 65.2-401) dealing with ordinary diseases of life. See Woody v. Mark Winkler
Management, 1 Va. App. 147, 149-50, 336 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1985).
15. 1 Va. App. 141, 336 S.E.2d 515 (1985).
16. 4 Va. App. 193, 355 S.E.2d 892 (1987), rev'd, 238 Va. 578, 385 S.E.2d 858 (1989).
17. No. 1175-87-4, (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 1988), rev'd sub nom., Morris v. Morris, 238 Va.
578, 385 S.E.2d 858 (1989).
18. No. 1587-87-4, (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 1988), rev'd sub nom., Morris v. Morris, 238 Va.
578, 385 S.E.2d 858 (1989).
19. Bradley, 1 Va. App. at 143, 336 S.E.2d at 516.
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Commission reversed, and the court of appeals affirmed the denial
of benefits.2
Even though the denial of benefits was affirmed, the court of ap-
peals stated that there was an identifiable incident. The court
stated that it did "not understand the term 'identifiable incident'
to mean an event or activity bounded with rigid temporal preci-
sion. It is, rather, a particular work activity which takes place
within a reasonably discrete time frame." 1 In this case, the time
frame was three hours.2 This case led to what was called "the
three hour rule", i.e., if the time elapsed was three hours or less,
the injury was compensable.
2 3
In Morris v. Morris, the claimant worked for approximately
forty-five minutes loading ninety-six cartons of fiberglass, each
weighing fifty pounds, onto his truck.24 A few minutes after com-
pleting this work, he experienced an acute myocardial infarction.
The deputy Commissioner denied compensation benefits and the
full Commission affirmed. The court of appeals, however, reversed
the decision.25 This case, in turn, led to the creation of the "forty-
five minute" rule.26
In Door Systems v. Hood, the claimant and a fellow employee
unloaded seven steel garage doors during an hour-and-a-half pe-
riod. Later in the day, the claimant experienced soreness in his
back which he attributed to a "pulled muscle." The pain worsened,
and physician determined that the claimant had sustained a rup-
tured disc. The deputy Commissioner awarded benefits. This was
affirmed by the full Commission and the court of appeals.2
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass v. Totten, the claimant worked on a
scaffold securing 30-35 pound panels with a drill and screw gun
from 6:30 to 9:30 a.m. The area where he worked was hot and had
no ventilation. He began to experience pain which was diagnosed
as a myocardial infarction. As a result of this injury, the deputy
20. Id. at 146, 336 S.E.2d at 518.
21. Id. at 145, 336 S.E.2d at 517.
22. Id.
23. See Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 582-83, 385 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1989) (citing Deputy
Commissioner's application of Bradley). See also Morris v. Morris, 4 Va. App. 193, 199-200,
355 S.E.2d 892, 897 (1987).
24. Morris, 4 Va. App. at 195, 355 S.E.2d at 893.
25. Id. at 200, 353 S.E.2d at 897.




Commissioner awarded compensation and this decision was af-
firmed by the full Commission and the court of appeals.2
The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated Morris, Hood, and
Totten for review" and found, pursuant to section 17-116.07(B) of
the Code,3" that these cases involved "matters of significant prece-
dential value." 3' 1 In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme
court noted that:
Perhaps the most frequently recurring invitation to expand the cov-
erage of the Act has been extended by those who wish to broaden
the meaning of the statutory term 'injury by accident' to include
injuries which, although work-related, are either gradually incurred
or sustained at an unknown time.
32
The court emphasized that its prior decisions consistently re-
jected expanding the statutory terminology in this manner. The
court ruled that the court of appeals' statement in Bradley v.
Philip Morris implying that an "identifiable accident" meant a
work activity taking place in a "reasonably discrete time frame"
was dictum; even as dictum the court held it to be an incorrect
statement of the law. In doing so, the court reiterated its position
that any change in the law must come from the General Assembly,
not from the courts.33
Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals
and stated unequivocally that "injuries resulting from repetitive
trauma, continuing mental or physical stress, or other cumulative
events, as well as injuries sustained at an unknown time, are not
'injuries by accident' ... ,
The court's strict interpretation nonetheless leaves room for
compensable injuries that appear to fit into the category set forth
by the court. Occupational diseases are the most obvious example.
Additionally, the situation is different where the claimant can
point to a specific incident, even if it is a part of a series of
activities.
28. Morris, 238 Va. at 583-84, 385 S.E.2d at 861.
29. Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 385 S.E.2d 858.
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-1.16.07(B) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
31. Morris, 238 Va. at 580, 385 S.E.2d at 859.
32. Id. at 584-85, 385 S.E.2d at 862.
33. Id. at 588, 385 S.E.2d at 864.
34. Id. at 589,-385 S.E.2d at 865.
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In Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. McGlothlin, 5 the claimant was a
heavy equipment operator whose work required him to operate
machinery in uneven terrain. In the course of his work, he sus-
tained several "jerks" and "jolts," one of which hurt so badly that
he "couldn't operate correctly after that."36 Even so, he continued
to work and the pain continued to increase. Afterwards it was de-
termined that he had suffered a herniated disc and he was awarded
compensation.3
D. Compensable Consequences
The employer is also liable for the "compensable consequences"
of the original work-related injury.38 The classic case occurs when
an employee falls while walking on crutches, the use of crutches
being necessitated by the first injury. 9
In a recent case, Bartholow Drywall v. Hill,40 the claimant sus-
tained a compensable back injury in July, 1986. In January, 1989,
as a result of her back injury, she fell at home and injured her
wrist. The court of appeals found the doctrine of compensable con-
sequences to apply to new injuries (the wrist), as well as to aggra-
vation of earlier injuries and found also that the time limitation for
the new injury was governed by section 65.1-87 (now 65.2-601) of
the Code.4' When the compensable consequence causes a change in
condition, however, section 65.1-99 (now 65.2-708) governs.42
The compensable consequences doctrine usually comes into play
as a basis for an application of benefits due to a change in condi-
tion. However, it can be a new injury if all of the requirements of
the "injury by accident" test are met.
43
35. 2 Va. App. 294, 343 S.E.2d 94 (1986).
36. Id. at 296, 343 S.E.2d at 95.
37. Id. at 298, 343 S.E.2d at 97.
38. Morris v. Badger Powhatan/Figgie Int'l, Inc., 3 Va. App. 276, 348 S.E.2d 876 (1986).
39. See, e.g., Leonard v. Arnold, 218 Va. 210, 237 S.E.2d 97 (1977).
40. 12 Va. App. 790, 407 S.E.2d 1 (1991).
41. Id. at 797, 407 S.E.2d at 5 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-601 (Repl. Vol. 1991)).
42. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-708 (Repl. Vol. 1991)).
43. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Gryder, 9 Va. App. 60, 383 S.E.2d 755 (1989).
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IV. ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT
The "arising out of the employment" prong deals with the activ-
ity being performed by the claimant and the conditions under
which the activity is being performed.
In County of Chesterfield v. Johnson,4 the claimant abruptly
turned at the top of a flight of stairs in order to return to the base-
ment and check a meter. His knee gave way as he turned, causing
him to fall. Since there was nothing unusual about the steps and
nothing to explain the reason for the knee giving way, the Virginia
Supreme Court found that the claim was not compensable."'
In Richard E. Brown, Inc. v. Caporaletti,46 the court of appeals
reaffirmed Virginia's position as an "actual risk" rather than "posi-
tional risk" state.41 The court distinguished this case from Johnson
and awarded benefits because the activity involved required "un-
usual exertion.
48
In order to satisfy the "arising out of" test in a third party as-
sault or action, there must be proof that the assault or action was
directed at the claimant because of her capacity or status as an
employee.49 In addition, if an employer conducts a social event
which is deemed to be incidental to the business, an employee who
is injured at the function may have a valid claim for compensa-
tion." This type of situation requires a very fact-specific inquiry.51
44. 237 Va. 180, 376 S.E.2d 73 (1989).
45. Id. at 186, 376 S.E.2d at 76.
46. 12 Va. App. 242, 402 S.E.2d 709 (1991).
47. See id. at 243-44, 402 S.E.2d at 710. See also Mullins v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 10
Va. App. 304, 306, 391 S.E.2d 609, 611 (1990) (distinguishing "positional risk" and "actual
risk" jurisdictions).
48. Caporaletti, 12 Va. App. at 245, 402 S.E.2d at 711. In Caporaletti, the claimant was
injured while gradually lowering a 100 pound furnace on its side and while bending over the
furnace for four to five minutes performing work activities. Id. at 244, 402 S.E.2d at 710.
This case also distinguished Plumb Rite Plumbing Service v. Barbour, 8 Va. App. 482, 382
S.E.2d 305 (1989).
49. See Hill City Trucking, Inc. v. Christian, 238 Va. 735, 385 S.E.2d 377 (1989) (denying
compensation to a truck driver robbed and shot after cashing a check at a truck stop).
50. See generally Kim v. Sportswear, 10 Va. App. 460, 393 S.E.2d 418 (1990) (injury sus-
tained at New Year's Eve party sponsored by employer and utilized to obtain good will of
employees deemed compensable); Mullins v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 10 Va. App. 304, 391
S.E.2d 609 (1990) (injury during basketball game prior to work shift did not arise out of
employment).
51. See Kim, 10 Va. App. at 465-68, 393 S.E.2d at 422-23.
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V. IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
The "in the course of employment" prong relates to the time
and place of the injury and to the activity being performed.
In Briley v. Farm Fresh,52 the plaintiff, an employee of Farm
Fresh, was shopping at the store after going off duty. She slipped
and fell while shopping and consequently filed a civil negligence
action against Farm Fresh. Because of the workers' compensation
bar, the trial court dismissed the case.53
On appeal, the supreme court upheld the dismissal because
the plaintiff would not likely have been at the supermarket at 2:00
a.m. but for her employment there. Moreover, the risks that led to
her injury were all part of the work environment. In sum, the plain-
tiff was injured at a place where she was reasonably expected to be
while engaged in an activity reasonably incidental to her employ-
ment by the defendant.54
In Sentara Leigh Hospital v. Nichols, 55 the claimant was injured
in an automobile accident while travelling from her home to a pa-
tient's home. As a home health nurse, she had no office and per-
formed her duties in the homes of her patients. She was not paid
for mileage or for travel time. 6
The court of appeals held that the claim was barred by the "go-
ing and coming rule," which denies compensation for accidents go-
ing to or coming from work unless one of three exceptions is met.
5 7
The three exceptions are as follows:
(1) where the means of transportation to or from work is pro-
vided by the employer or the employee's travel time is paid for or
included in wages;
(2) where the way used is the sole means of ingress and egress or
is constructed by the employer; and
52. 240 Va. 194, 396 S.E.2d 835 (1990).
53. Id. at 196-97, 396 S.E.2d at 836.
54. Id. at 198, 396 S.E.2d at 837. See also Thore v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervi-
sors, 10 Va. App. 327, 391 S.E.2d 882 (1990).
55. 12 Va. App. 841, 407 S.E.2d 334 (1991), afl'd on reh'g, 13 Va. App. 630, 414 S.E.2d 426
(1992) (en banc).
56. Sentara, 12 Va. App. at 845, 407 S.E.2d at 336.
57. Id. at 845, 407 S.E.2d at 337.
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(3) where the employee is charged with some duty or task con-
nected with his employment while on his way to or from work. 5 In
this case, the court found that none of the three exceptions was
met.59
VI. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
Occupational disease claims 0 are governed by sections 65.2-400
("occupational disease" defined)61 and -401 ("ordinary disease of
life" coverage).6 2 Section 65.2-401 was enacted in 1986 to provide
coverage for ordinary diseases of life which had been previously
excluded from coverage in the occupational disease statute.6
The burden of proof is different for each claim. Section 65.2-400
requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence to establish a
claim for occupational disease, 64 while section 65.2-401 requires
proof of ordinary disease of life "by clear and convincing evidence,
to a reasonable medical certainty."6 5
The occupational disease statutes are an entity unto themselves.
They operate concurrently with, but separately from, the injury by
accident provisions.6 For example, a claimant may file a claim al-
leging alternatively an occupational disease and an injury by acci-
dent. Accordingly, a claimant can initially pursue a claim for bene-
fits under an accidental injury theory and thereafter, if the claim is
unsuccessful, file another claim for occupational disease.6 This
practice is not barred by res judicata because each claim represents
a different cause of action.68 Further, as the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals has noted, "[u]nlike claims based on injury by accident,
claims arising from an occupational disease may be pursued more
58. Id. at 843, 407 S.E.2d at 335.
59. Id. at 845, 407 S.E.2d at 337.
60. For a discussion ofoccupational disease claims in Virginia through 1985, see Elizabeth
V. Scott, Workers' Compensation for Disease in Virginia: The Exception Swallows the
Rule, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 161 (1985).
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-400 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
62. Id. § 65.2-401.
63. Act of Apr. 2, 1986, ch. 378, 1986 Va. Acts 623 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-401
(Repl. Vol. 1991)).
64. Virginia Dep't of State Police v. Talbert, 1 Va. App. 250, 337 S.E.2d 307 (1985).
65. VA. CODa ANN. § 65.2-401 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
66. See supra notes 9-43 and accompanying text.
67. Wood v. Allison Apparel Mktg., Inc., 11 Va. App. 352, 398 S.E.2d 110 (1990).
68. Id.
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than once when based on different medical evidence establishing
the disease." 9
VII. ORDINARY DISEASE OF LIFE
Ordinary disease claims are decided "on a case by case basis, ad-
hering to the strict proof that is required in the statute.
'70
Probably the most prevalent type of workers' compensation
claim is one involving an injury to the back. In Holly Farms/Fed-
eral Co. v. Yancey,71 the Industrial Commission found that a lum-
bar strain constituted an ordinary disease of life and awarded com-
pensation benefits. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and
held that a back injury which developed over a period of time must
be considered an injury and cannot qualify as an occupational
disease.72
An increased awareness of the physical and mental strain im-
posed by various aspects of employment has increased both the
number of people seeking treatment and the number of claimants
pursuing compensation.73 Emotional stress has been found by the
Commission to be an ordinary disease of life.74 Accordingly, a
claimant must meet the more stringent "clear and convincing"
proof requirements of section 65.2-401 when her claim involves
emotional stress.75
An area which has received attention by the courts recently is
post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD). In Hercules, Inc. v. Gun-
ther,71 the claimant was delivering rocket propellant when it ex-
ploded. The force lifted him off the ground and caused the death
69. AMP, Inc. v. Ruebush, 10 Va. App. 270, 274, 391 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1990).
70. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 7 Va. App. 684, 687, 376 S.E.2d 814, 816 (1989) (hearing
loss).
71. 228 Va. 337, 321 S.E.2d 298 (1984).
72. Id. at 341, 321 S.E.2d at 300.
73. VIRGINIA LAW FOUNDATION, WORKERS' COMPENSATION FOR THE EMPLOYER'S ATTORNEY
AND CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY 13 (4th ed. 1992). In 1989, there were 56,922 lost time claims and
156,914 minor medical claims filed for a total of 213,836. In 1990, the lost time claims to-
talled 61,849 with 155,607 minor medical claims. In 1991, there were 59,943 lost time claims
and 123,603 minor medical claims. As of September 1, 1992, there have been 35,931 lost
time claims and 90,409 minor medical claims for a total of 126,340. Telephone interview
with Jim Sutton, Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission (Sept. 1, 1992). See also
Exec. Order No. 50(92), supra note 5, at 1.
74. Mitchell v. City of Newport News, 65 O.I.C. 126 (1986).
75. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
76. 13 Va. App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991).
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of two of his coworkers. He was able to return to work the next day
but continued to suffer from anxiety-related symptoms. Ulti-
mately, he was diagnosed as suffering from PTSD.7
7
The employer's defense rested on Chesterfield County Fire De-
partment v. Dunn,78 where the court of appeals held that PTSD
does not constitute an injury by accident.
The court of appeals distinguished Dunn and held that in this
case PTSD was an injury by accident as it related to the "obvious
sudden shock or fright which [the claimant] sustained in the
course of his employment.""9
The Virginia Court of Appeals has also held that "[e]motional
harm following physical injury is compensable, even when the
physical injury does not directly cause the emotional conse-
quence."80 Applying this rule, the court awarded compensation to
an employee who developed headaches and panic attacks after be-
ing sprayed in the face with aerosol insecticide."' In contrast, the
court of appeals in Dunn refused to award benefits to an emer-
gency medical technician (EMT) who developed post-traumatic
stress syndrome after treating a severely injured man who later
died. 2 The court found that the EMT failed to prove an injury by
accident.8 3 This case, decided in 1990, concerned a 1985 "injury"
and a diagnosis in June, 1986.84 It should be noted that the injury'
in Dunn preceded the enactment of section 65.1-46.1 (now 65.2-




The concept of statutory employer has great significance in the
areas of workers' compensation and personal injury law by provid-
ing a source of insurance coverage when the immediate employer
lacks coverage. In a personal injury context, it can provide a de-
77. Id. at 359, 412 S.E.2d at 186.
78. 9 Va. App. 475, 389 S.E.2d 180 (1990).
79. Gunther, 13 Va. App. at 363, 412 S.E.2d at 188.
80. Seneca Falls Greenhouse & Nursery v. Layton, 9 Va. App. 482, 486, 389 S.E.2d 184,
187 (1990).
81. Id. at 485, 389 S.E.2d at 186.
82. Dunn, 9 Va. App. at 476, 389 S.E.2d at 181.
83. Id. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 181.
84. Id. at 476, 389 S.E.2d at 181.
85. V& CODE ANN. § 65.2-401 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
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fense pursuant to the exclusivity provisions of the Act. Statutory
employers are covered by section 65.2-302 of the Code.s"
The purpose of this statute and its predecessors is to extend the
coverage of the Act to
all persons engaged in work that is part of the trade, business, or
occupation of the party who undertakes as owner or who contracts
as contractor to perform the work, and to make liable to every em-
ployee engaged in the work every such owner, contractor or subcon-
tractor above such employee.87
Only "other parties" or "strangers to the employment" are subject
to liability in a civil action. "Fellow employees" and employers are
protected by the Act. The 1991 amendment to the statute was
designed to clarify these relationships."'
The cases in which an employee is seeking compensation from
an employer or owner are referred to as "right side up" cases.
Cases in which the employee seeks civil damages instead of com-
pensation from the owner are referred to as "upside down" cases.
Regardless of the posture of the case, courts must liberally con-
strue the Act in favor of providing workers' compensation
coverage.8
In Nichols v. VVKR, Inc.,90 the Virginia Supreme Court went
through the analysis required in evaluating the use of an earlier
version of section 65.1-29 as a bar to civil liability. The first ques-
tion is whether the "nature" of the owner makes it a private or
public enterprise."' This issue is significant because it determines
the standard to be applied. If the owner is a private entity, a court
will determine whether the activity is one normally carried out by
employees rather than independent contractors. If the owner is a
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-302 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
87. Smith v. Horn, 232 Va. 302, 305, 351 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1986) (suit by an employee of one
independent contractor barred against an employee of another independent contractor hired
by the same owner).
88. See CODE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at introduction.
89. See generally Henderson v. Central Telephone Co., 233 Va. 377, 355 S.E.2d 596
(1987).
90. 241 Va. 516, 403 S.E.2d 698 (1991). See also Ford v. City of Richmond, 239 Va. 664,
391 S.E.2d 270 (1990) (municipality was statutory employer of contractor's employee).
91. Nichols, 241 Va. at 520, 403 S.E.2d at 701.
[Vol. 26:903
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
public or governmental entity, its business will be deemed to in-
clude everything that the entity is authorized to do.
92
In Nichols, the supreme court found that an employee of a sub-
contractor could sue an allegedly negligent architectural and engi-
neering firm which contracted with an independent public agency.
The firm could not make use of the rule applicable to governmen-
tal owners.98
In Evans v. Hook,94 the court reached a different conclusion. Ev-
ans involved an injured construction company employee who filed
suit against the masonry contractor and the architect involved in
the project. This case differed from Nichols in that there the court
found that the construction and rehabilitation of the facility was
not a part of the trade, business, or occupation of the transit
company. 5
The statutory employer question arises most often in construc-
tion cases;98 however, it can be seen in many other business situa-
tions. In Carmody v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,97 an employee of Photo
Corporation of America (PCA) was injured while working in a
Woolco Department Store. After receiving workers' compensation
from PCA, he filed suit against F.W. Woolworth. PCA had a li-
cense from Woolworth to operate a portrait photography depart-
ment in its store in exchange for 10% of the sales made.
Woolworth did all of the advertising in its own name, and the PCA
name was not used. PCA employees wore Woolworth uniforms and
were required to follow the Woolworth employee rules and regula-
tions. 8 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that
the plaintiff was a statutory employee of Woolworth, stating that
PCA "was in the business of retail sales and its business repre-
sented merely an extension of the owner's retail sales business to
include an additional type of goods." 99
92. Id.
93. Id. at 522, 403 S.E.2d at 702.
94. 239 Va. 127, 387 S.E.2d 777 (1990).
95. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
96. See Cinnamon v. IBM, 238 Va. 471, 384 S.E.2d 618 (1989) (manufacturer who hired a
general contractor who subcontracted work to the plaintiff's direct employer is not the stat-
utory employer of the plaintiff); Henderson v. Central Telephone Co., 233 Va. 377, 355
S.E.2d 596 (1987); Whalen v. Dean Steel Erection Co., 229 Va. 164, 327 S.E.2d 102 (1985);
A.G. Van Metre, Jr., Inc. v. Gandy, 7 Va. App. 207, 372 S.E.2d 198 (1988).
97. 234 Va. 198, 361 S.E.2d 128 (1987).
98. Id. at 202, 361 S.E.2d at 130.
99. Id. at 206, 361 S.E.2d at 132.
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It must be noted that for the statutory employer issue to arise,
the injured party must be an "employee" as defined by the Act.
For example, a self-employed truck driver who owns his own
equipment and is injured while moving trailers for a flat rate per
trailer is an independent contractor and not an employee. 10 The
Supreme Court of Virginia has consistently declined to extend cov-
erage of the Act "by judicial fiat" leaving any such extension to the
province of the General Assembly.' 0 '
IX. EXCLUSIVITY
In Haddon v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,02 the
plaintiff filed a civil action against her employer and a supervisor,
alleging that she had been subjected to harassment and sex dis-
crimination. The defendants demurred on the ground that the ac-
tion was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act. The trial court sustained the demurrers, and the
plaintiff appealed. 03
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that (1) this was not an injury
"by accident"'0 4 and (2) there should be an exception to the exclu-
sivity provision in cases of intentional torts. 05 The court rejected
both arguments and found that the actions complained of fell
within the ambit of the Act.10 6 Soon thereafter, in Kelly v. First
Virginia Bank, 0 7 the supreme court found that the Act barred a
bank employee's sexual harassment civil suit against her supervi-
sor. 10 In response to these cases, the General Assembly amended
section 65.2-301 to remove sexual harassment claims from coverage
under the Act.'09
100. Intermodel Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 234 Va. 596, 607, 364 S.E.2d 221, 228 (1988).
101. Id. at 603. A contractor cannot avoid the coverage of the Act by performing all of his
work through subcontractors and having no employees of his own. The employees of all of
the subcontractors can be added together in order to meet the "three or more employee"
requirement. Smith v. Weber, 3 Va. App. 379, 350 S.E.2d 213 (1986).
102. 239 Va. 397, 389 S.E.2d 712 (1990).
103. Id. at 398, 389 S.E.2d at 713.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 399, 389 S.E.2d at 713.
106. Id. at 400, 389 S.E.2d at 714.
107. 404 S.E.2d 723 (1991). Strong dissents were filed by Justice Hassell and by Justice
Lacy, with whom Justice Whiting joined.
108. Id.
109. Act of Mar. 26, 1992, ch. 469, 1992 Va. Acts 603 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-
301 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
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In another decision, the Act was held not to bar similar actions.
In Snead v. Harbaugh,10 the supreme court held that a defama-
tion action was not barred by the Act. The court noted that the
plaintiff claimed only general damages and not personal injury. It
specifically noted that the issue of whether defamation had caused
physical injury or emotional distress was not before the court, im-
plying that the result might be different in such cases."' 1
In addition, an employee can recover pursuant to the employer's
self-insured uninsured motorist plan if the accident involves a
third party, rather than a fellow employee. The "exclusivity provi-
sion" does not serve as a bar.
1 1 2
X. SETTLEMENT OF THIRD PARTY CLAIMS
Often a workers' compensation claim will also give rise to a per-
sonal injury claim against a third party. The employer/insurer has
a lien against any recovery for medical and compensation benefits
which have been paid. Those who fail to consult with the carrier
prior to settling the third party case do so at their peril.
In Ball v. C.D.W. Enterprises, Inc.,115 the claimant was injured
when the crane he was operating came into contact with an electri-
cal wire. The claimant filed a five million dollar lawsuit that ulti-
mately was settled for five thousand dollars without the knowledge
or consent of the employer/insurer. By that time, the compensa-
tion lien was three hundred thousand dollars. Because of the set-
tlement, the claimant's right to any further compensation and
medical benefits terminated.
1 1 4
The claimant argued that his rights to compensation should not
have been terminated because he received none of the proceeds
from the settlement. The court disagreed, stating that "[t]he ter-
mination of the appellant's right to further compensation derives
not from what he may have received, but rather from his extin-
guishment of the subrogation rights of the employer and
insurer."115
110. 241 Va. 524, 404 S.E.2d 53 (1991). Snead involved a defamation claim brought by a
tenured faculty member against the dean and faculty of the University of Richmond's T.C.
Williams School of Law. Id. at 525, 404 S.E.2d at 54.
111. Id. at 527, 404 S.E.2d at 55.
112. William v. City of Newport News, 240 Va. 425, 434, 397 S.E.2d 813, 818 (1990).
113. 13 Va. App. 470, 413 S.E.2d 66 (1992).
114. Id. at 471, 413 S.E.2d at 67.
115. Id. at 474, 413 S.E.2d at 69.
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Green v. Warwick Plumbing & Heating Corp.116 concerned the
related and often encountered situation in which a claimant's com-
pensable injury is exacerbated by a subsequent non-work injury. In
Green, the claimant was injured in May, 1983 and received bene-
fits until they were terminated by the Commission. In March,
1984, he was involved in an automobile accident which exacerbated
his 1983 injury. The resulting accident case was settled without the
consent of the carrier. The court of appeals found that the right to
compensation was extinguished even though the employer failed to
pay any of the medical expenses related to the accident and had
failed to intervene as a third party in the case.
11 7
In City of Newport News v. Blankenship,"" however, the settle-
ment .of a third party claim without the consent of the employer
did not terminate the party's right to future payments because the
exacerbation of the work-related injury was merely temporary
(eleven days of disability) and the claimant returned to his pre-
second injury condition. 119
XI. ESTOPPEL AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
If a claim for benefits is not "filed" within two years of the date
of the injury, the claim is forever barred. 2 0 Since most cases are
not contested and are handled directly between employees and in-
surance carriers or servicing agencies, there is a great opportunity
for informality or inattention which may lead to a claim not being
filed within the statutory period.
Voluntary payment of compensation or medical benefits, without
more, does not estop the employer from asserting the statute of
limitations. 2' However, when such payments are accompanied by
representations of continued payments and the claimant is induced
to not file a claim, the statute of limitations cannot be used as a
defense.' 22 In such instances, when there is an "imposition on the
116. 5 Va. App. 409, 364 S.E.2d 4 (1988).
117. Id. at 412, 364 S.E.2d at 6.
118. 10 Va. App. 704, 396 S.E.2d 145 (1990).
119. Id.
120. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-406, -601 (Repl. Vol. 1991). However, certain occupational
diseases are addressed by a three-year statute of limitations and the cause of action may
accrue upon discovery. Id. § 65.2-406.
121. Rose v. Red's Hitch & Trailer Serv., 11 Va. App. 55, 396 S.E.2d 392 (1990).
122. Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Jones, 12 Va. App. 1028, 1032-33, 407 S.E.2d 919, 921 (1991).
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Commission and the claimant," the employer is estopped from re-
lying on the statute of limitations. 2 '
In addition, under the new section 65.2-602, if (i) the employer
has notice of an accident and pays compensation or wages during
the period of disability and (ii) fails to file an employer's first re-
port of accident and (iii) this has prejudiced the employee's rights
with respect to filing a claim within the limitation period, the pe-
riod is tolled for the length of time that payments are made or
until the first report is filed.
124
Mutual mistake that an open award is in place does not estop an
employer from asserting affirmative defenses to the claim. 125 Nor
does failure of the employer to fie an accident report.28
Finally, payment of compensation under the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,' 2 with no filings under the
state Act, does not toll the limitation period.'
28
XII. CONCLUSION
As in most areas of the law, Virginia courts continue to decline
the opportunity to expand the scope of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act to reflect advances in medical diagnosis and changes in
society at large. That task has been left to the General Assembly,
and with the Governor's Advisory Commission set to make its rec-
ommendations in December, the door is open for more change in
the near future.
123. Avon Products, Inc. v. Ross, 14 Va. App. 1, 8, 415 S.E.2d 225, 229, (1992).
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-602 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
125. Niblett v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 12 Va. App. 652, 655, 405 S.E.2d 635, 637 (1991).
126. Hervey v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 12 Va. App. 88, 92, 402
S.E.2d 688, 690 (1991).
127. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988).
128. Bowden v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 11 Va. App. 683, 686-88,
401 S.E.2d 884, 886 (1991).
1992]

